

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
④	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC		X		
16	C/ACIS		X		
17	D/SOVA		X		
18	NIO/SP		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
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SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

19 Sept 85

Date

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WASHINGTON

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Round III Instructions (S)

The attached instructions are approved for Round III of the US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Negotiations which will reconvene on September 19, 1985. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

Attachments:
As stated.

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SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR US-SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

A. STATE 72682

B. STATE 162420

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DEL FOR THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS, BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1985. OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS (REFS A & B) REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL.

3. OBJECTIVES: U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE THIRD ROUND INCLUDE IMPRESSING UPON THE SOVIETS THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

A. IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY BY ABANDONING THEIR PRECONDITIONS ON SDI AND INF ISSUES AND THEIR LINKAGE OF PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, BY PROVIDING SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF SOVIET PROPOSALS, AND BY DEMONSTRATING A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER U.S. PROPOSALS OR SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS THAT CAN MEET BOTH SIDES' CONCERNS.

B. ANY AGREEMENT MUST SATISFY THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS OF THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, THE U.S. NEGOTIATORS ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES; IT SEEKS TO ACHIEVE THEM IN WAYS THAT ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

4. NOVEMBER MEETING: IN IMPLEMENTING ITS INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. DEL SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING A CONSTRUCTIVE AND PROMISING FOUNDATION FOR DISCUSSIONS OF NST ISSUES BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER. WHEN THIS MATTER COMES UP, U.S. DEL MAY PROBE FOR SOVIET VIEWS AND RESPOND TO SOVIET QUERIES ALONG THE LINE THAT PROGRESS IN ROUND III COULD AID IN ENSURING A PRODUCTIVE MEETING.

5. IMPORTANCE OF GENEVA PROCESS: THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT IF THEY ARE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN PROMOTING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY SHOULD REGARD THE CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA TALKS AS THE APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORUM. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND REMARKS TO INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CREATE AMBIGUITIES AND CONFUSION ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION, TEND TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOTIVATION OF THE SOVIET APPROACH WHEN UNACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL PROPOSALS IN GENEVA.

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6. MUTUAL RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO EXISTING AGREEMENTS: MAY DRAW APPROPRIATELY ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND UNCLASSIFIED FACTSHEET OF JUNE 10, 1985, FOR USE IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SOVIETS.

7. COMPLIANCE: CONTINUE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL OF COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND THE CRITICAL NEED FOR SOVIET CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN AREAS OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE.

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SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS FOR ROUND III BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 19, 1985. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUNDS I AND II (REFTEL) REMAINS IN EFFECT.

3. EVOLVING OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD EXPRESS US VIEWS TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THIS EVOLUTION AND INVITE SOVIET THOUGHTS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY DRAW UPON EXISTING, AUTHORATIVE UNCLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT MATERIALS ABOUT SOVIET ISSUES SELECTIVELY TO DO THIS AS THEY JUDGE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY, RECOGNIZING THAT THESE MATERIALS HAVE DIFFERENT DATES AND ARE NOT OF EQUAL AUTHENTICITY. ONE EXAMPLE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT IS THE UNCLASSIFIED TESTIMONY PRESENTED ON 26 JUNE 1985 BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. THESE MATERIALS ALSO MAY BE USED SIMILARLY AS THE BASIS FOR RESPONDING TO SOVIET STATEMENTS REGARDING THEIR OWN STRATEGIC ACTIVITIES. THE GROUP SHOULD ENSURE, HOWEVER, THAT IT DOES NOT GO BEYOND APPROVED, UNCLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT MATERIALS IN MAKING SUCH PRESENTATIONS, OR IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET SIDE, SO AS TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. CITATIONS OF SOME TOPICS, SUCH AS THE SOVIET SAM SYSTEM SA-X-12, ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN AND SHOULD BE USED SPARINGLY.

4. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD RESIST BEING DRAWN INTO DISCUSSIONS OF THE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS. TO THE EXTENT THE DELEGATION IS OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET CHARGES, IT SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT THE AGREED TREATY AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AS CLARIFIED BY THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, ARE MUTUALLY BINDING. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP WILL BE PROVIDED FURTHER GUIDANCE AND ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON WHICH IT MAY DRAW, BY SEPTTEL.

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SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP

A. STATE 72684

B. STATE 162424

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC ARMS FOR THE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 19.

3. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS OF START REMAINS IN EFFECT.

4. APPROACH TO ROUND III: BUILDING UPON THE OVERALL APPROACH ADOPTED IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD:

- A. PRESS THE SOVIETS TO ENGAGE IN CONCRETE BARGAINING ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND NOT TO HOLD PROGRESS HOSTAGE TO SOVIET AIMS IN THE AREA OF SPACE ARMS OR TO LINK THEIR START POSITION TO THE RESOLUTION OF INF ISSUES.
- B. CONTINUE TO PROBE SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO TRADE-OFFS, REAFFIRMING OUR BASIC START OBJECTIVES AND REITERATING THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S BROAD AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING THOSE OBJECTIVES.
- C. ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR POSITION, PRESSING THEM TO EXPLAIN HOW THEIR "MODEL OF AN AGREEMENT" MEETS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT STABILITY AND OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN MORE AND LESS DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS (E.G., DEEP REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND THROW-WEIGHT, EXCLUSION OF GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, ETC.), PROBING THE EXTENT OF THEIR FLEXIBILITY ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THEIR MODEL, AND POINTING OUT THAT, WITHOUT KNOWING THE DEFINITIONS AND NUMBERS THEY HAVE IN MIND, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE USEFULNESS OF THIS APPROACH.
- D. INDICATE, IN DISCUSSING SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS, THAT WE PLACE GREATER IMPORTANCE ON REDUCTIONS IN THE CATEGORY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS THAN WE PLACE ON CONSTRAINTS ON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND THAT WE ARE FLEXIBLE ON THE NUMBER OF SNDVs SO LONG AS OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS AND THROWWEIGHT AND CONCERNS ON STABILITY ARE MET.

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E. MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE BELIEVE ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN IN THIS ROUND TO THE ISSUES OF STRUCTURE AND LEVELS OF AN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ABANDONMENT OF UNREALISTIC SOVIET POSITIONS ON ALCMs AND SLCMs, DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES, ETC., THAT WE SEE VALUE IN PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES INCLUDING PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION AND SEPARATE MOVEMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

5. IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVES OR IF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO WARRANTS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ADVISE WHEN IT BELIEVES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND SHOULD PROVIDE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS IT WISHES TO MAKE.

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SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR INF NEGOTIATING GROUP, ROUND III

A. STATE 72685

B. STATE 162421

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR INF NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS; BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 19, 1985. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, INF GUIDANCE FOR ROUNDS I AND II (REFTELS) REMAINS IN EFFECT.

3. GENERAL APPROACH. DURING THE FALL, THE SOVIETS WILL IN ALL LIKELIHOOD MAKE SOME VISIBLE PUBLIC GESTURES INTENDED TO AFFECT THE DUTCH GLCM DEPLOYMENT DECISION AND TO IMPROVE THEIR OVERALL ARMS CONTROL POSTURE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NOVEMBER REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON AND WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES, ALONG WITH POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC RESPONSES. INF GROUP SHOULD BE ALERT TO INDICATIONS OF IMPENDING MOVES AND MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. THE U.S. DEL SHOULD CONTINUE ITS VIGOROUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AS A MEANS OF COUNTERING SUCH SOVIET EFFORTS TO PLACE US ON THE DEFENSIVE AND MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS. ACCORDINGLY, THE INF GROUP SHOULD:

- CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE U.S. INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME CONSISTENT WITH OUR BASIC CRITERIA; I.E., 1) EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS, 2) BILATERAL US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS ONLY, 3) GLOBALITY, 4) NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE, AND, 5) EFFECTIVE VERIFIABILITY;
- PROBE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MODIFY ITS CURRENT INTRANSIGENT POSITION;
- BE PREPARED TO EXERCISE EXISTING CONTINGENT AUTHORITY, IF APPROPRIATE TACTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE, TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

5. DATA. UPDATED U.S. AND SOVIET INF NUMBERS ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL. INF GROUP MAY DRAW ON THE DATA SELECTIVELY, AS NEEDED, IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS TO REBUT SOVIET ASSERTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE INF BALANCE. THE GROUP SHOULD ASSURE THAT DATA ARE INTRODUCED IN CONTEXT OF CORRECTING SOVIET INACCURACIES AND DISTORTIONS SO AS TO AVOID CREATING THE MISIMPRESSION THAT THESE NUMBERS COULD BECOME A BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS.

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6. IF SOVIETS ASK WHETHER U.S. INTENDS TO SUGGEST INF MOBILE MISSILE MEASURES ANALOGOUS TO THOSE DISCUSSED CONCEPTUALLY IN START, U.S. MAY STATE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFYING ICBM AND INF MOBILE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS ARE SIMILAR. HOWEVER, THE DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF INF SYSTEMS MAY ENTAIL SOME VARIATIONS IN VERIFICATION APPROACHES. HOWEVER, THE INF GROUP WILL REQUEST FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON IN SUCH AN INSTANCE.

7. DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN ANY DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION OR DATA ISSUES THAT, WHILE COOPERATIVE MEASURES ARE NECESSARY TO VERIFY AGREED NUMERICAL CEILINGS ON LIMITED INF SYSTEMS, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR DATA REPRESENT THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF DEPLOYED INF SYSTEMS.

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